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Abstract
This article roots Kant’s concept of disinterestedness, as he uses it in the
Critique of Judgment, in Aristotle’s notion of philia by establishing a path from
ethics to aesthetics and back. In this way, the third Critique turns out to be one of
the main sources for a new ideal of humanity: the ideal suitable for late
Enlightenment. This article argues that Kant reaches this fruitful use of disinterest-
edness by giving to Aristotle’s concept of philia an aesthetic turn.
Keywords: Kant and Aristotle, Disinterestedness, Philia, Late Enlightenment,
Virtues for Democracy in the late 18th century, Communication for Social
Construction.
Friendships are not found in heaven, for heaven is the ultimate
in moral perfection, and that is universal; friendship, however,
is a special bond between particular persons; in this world only,
therefore, it is a recourse for opening one’s mind to the other
and communing with him.
Immanuel Kant, On Friendship2
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1. The Critique of the Power of Judgement3 and the late enlightenment mood
The Kritik der Urteilskraft (KU) considered as a whole is essentially a text
about critical teleology. Its rationale relates to an abandonment of the mechanistic
Cartesian philosophy of the Analytic of Concepts and the Analytic of Principles in
the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (KrV)4 as well as to the development of new perspec-
tives that were settled in the chapters ‘Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas
of Pure Reason’ and ‘Of the Ultimate End of the Natural Dialectic of Human
Reason’ from the ‘Transcendental Dialectics’ of the KrV.5 Here the transcendental
illusion of reason and the insatiability of this faculty are no longer seen as being
harmful to philosophy. Rather, they become challenges that, when properly clari-
fied, can be considered appropriate for a new generation of critical questions. These
are the seeds that are germinating in Kant’s third Critique, which is situated in the
abandonment of the mechanistic understanding of nature in favor of a more organ-
ic and teleological conception of natural objects (KU, Part II) and artificial objects
(KU, Part I). It is an option that favors the thinking of Aristotle and Leibniz rather
than that of Descartes, although both Aristotle and Leibniz are passed through the
sieve of criticism.
From an epistemological point of view, these new questions mean a radicaliza-
tion of Kant’s philosophy derived from a concern for the exercising of the faculty
for judging, highlighted with some insistence by the substitution in the third
Critique of the term Vermögen zu urteilen by Urteilskraft. From an ontological
point of view, the new questions mean the philosophical rescue of the field of the
empirical particular, traditionally pushed to one side and which until that point had
maintained reverential respect for the Aristotelian statement that there is no science
of the particular. That is why the fourth paragraph of the Introduction to the KU
states that the exercising of the faculty for judging is the exercising of ‘the faculty
for thinking of the particular as contained under the universal,’6 and the essential
concern of the KU as a whole is the exercising of reflecting judgment, in which
‘only the particular is given,’ and ‘for which the universal is to be found.’7 The term
exercising is added here to the term faculty because this is the original notion of
Kraft added to that of Vermögen. The search for a universal for a particular becomes
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Kant, Lectures on Ethics (2005). The quoted text is on page 188. These texts clearly show the
Aristotelian affiliation of Kant’s understanding of the term friendship.
3 Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft (KU), AA 5. See English version: Kant, Critique of the Power of
Judgment (2000).
4 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, AA 4. See English version: Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (1998).
5 Respectively: KrV A 642 / B 670 - A 668 / B 696, AA III, pp. 426-442; A 669 / B 697 - A 704 / B
732; AA III, pp. 442-461.
6 Kant, I., Introduction to KU § IV, 66. AA 5, p. 179. 
7 Ibid., § IV, 67. AA 5, p. 179.
a new task for a kind of thinking that adopts the form of critical teleology, of
Aristotelian–Leibnizian origin, but also strongly regulated by the use of the ‘as if’
(als ob) in the arrangement of the final causes.
Kant’s critical project thus embraces a new philosophical Weltanschauung,
which is simultaneously affected by the vulnerability of the privilege of the field of
the particular as well as by the audacity of privileging the exercising of reflecting
judgment. In the third Critique, metaphysics does away with epistemic pretensions
to become a science and, instead, turns towards a self-understanding of its respon-
sibility as a part of human knowledge that is as unalienable as it is vulnerable. This
self-understanding is developed through the critical attribution of final causes to
theoretical and practical questioning. The critical advance of the KU is that it sig-
nals, now contrary to both Aristotle and Leibniz, that the final causes are no more
than a pledge for thought, but one that is inevitably required for the insatiability of
reason, and therefore (and at last) final causes are something unavoidable for meta-
physics. From this moment metaphysics will conceive itself as a task both uncertain
and audacious, adapting itself to the late Enlightenment mood, marked so strongly
by the earthquake in Portugal and the French Revolution. That is to say, it will be
shaped by the uncertainty of the break of natural laws and by the audacity required
by the claims of democracy.
2. The path from Aristotle’s philia to Kant’s disinterestedness: from ethics to 
aesthetics and back
Audacity requires the action of a mind that is prepared to tackle unknown terri-
tory, even if the light is so dim that it barely illuminates the most immediate steps.
The late Enlightenment period demonstrated an awareness that the lights of reason
were discreet, what in the language of the time meant that they were ‘hypothetical’
or ‘problematic.’ The KU contributes to this Zeitgeist in devoting itself to setting up
a kind of intelligibility that vindicates its potential precisely based on this vulnera-
bility and in the most conscious exercising of audacity in the critical attribution of
ends, i.e., in its link with a philosophy that no longer belongs to the real world but
to the world of what is possible.8 The following pages show how the negative con-
cept of disinterestedness in the first part of the KU forms one of the keys to this
Zeitgeist, and that this is possible thanks to the fact that it is rooting in the
Aristotelian concept of philia.9
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Kant’s concepts of Philia. Derrida (1994) bridges the gap between both authors in his peculiar semi-
nar on politics of friendship.
Book VIII of the Nicomachean Ethics defines philia as a virtue (1155a).10 Its
specific nature is produced from the confluence of the following attributes: ‘it is one
of the most indispensable requirements of life’; it ‘is not only indispensable as a
means, it is also noble in itself’; it ‘promote[s] concord’; it requires reciprocated
feeling (1155b), that consists in the friends who ‘love each other for themselves and
not accidentally’ (1156b), meaning that ‘we ought to wish our friend well for his
own sake’ (1156a). This demonstrates a disinterested attitude, given that ‘friends
whose affection is based on utility do not love each other in themselves, but in so
far as some benefit accrues to them from each’ (1156a).11
Three conditions determine the possibility of reciprocity. The first one, that it
should occur ‘between the good, and those who resemble each other in virtue’
(1156b)12 – in other words, according to their similarity (1155b)–; the second one:
a constant exercising of attention or coexistence (1156b, 1157b); the third one: and
mutual confidence (1157a). Reciprocity is, in addition, the consequence of the exer-
cising of choice (1157b), and it occurs more frequently in democracies than in
tyrannies, given that in the former ‘the citizens being equal have many things in
common’ (1161b), with the result that ‘all friendship […] involves community’.
One of Kant’s greatest audacities was to convert the German language into a
philosophical language. Wolff’s effort, even taking into account its enormity, was
hugely insufficient. The little giant of Königsberg, learned in Greek philosophy,
adopted the same procedures as the first philosophers and devoted himself to inspir-
ing his vocabulary and his argumentations in the most advanced disciplines of his
own philosophical area: in science and in ethics. From this conviction, I will pro-
ceed to argue that the aesthetic concept of disinterestedness defended by Kant is
clearly anchored in the ethical notion of Aristotle’s philia, and that it traces a path
from ethics to aesthetics and back again.
Following one of his usual procedures when arduously creating a vocabulary in
his own language, Kant undertakes a first operation of negative argumentation with
the term ‘interest,’ which is certainly used by Aristotle in both physics and ethics.
In relation to this, and against the expression habitually employed by us, the inter-
preters, Kant does not use the term disinterestedness13 as a substantive, but rather
this negativity is being constructed in composed terms, as if Kant would be testing
the adequacy of a right expression. The most successful Kantian terms in this trial
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10 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, English version (1934).
11 See also 1157a.
12 See also 1157b, 1158b, 1159b.
13 For the genealogy of this concept, see Stolnitz (1961). This article is discussed in the following
ones: Allentuck (1962); Saisselin (1962); Schiller (1964). See also Stolniz (1963) and (1978). Other
papers discussing the genealogy of the concept are: White (1973); Rind, (2002), and Guyer, (1993).
For the further development of the concept of disinterestedness see: Vandenabeele (2001).
are: ‘pure and disinterested satisfaction’ (dem reinen uninteressierten Wohlgefallen
im Geschmackurteile, KU § 2), ‘disinterested and free satisfaction’ (ein uninteres-
siertes und freies Wohlgefallen, KU § 5), ‘disinterested judgment’ (ein bloßes
Geschmacksurteil ohne alles Interesse, KU § 42), ‘without any interest’ (ohne alles
Interesse, KU §§ 5, 6; wenn wir gleich am Objekte gar kein Interesse haben, KU §
25), ‘without interest’ (ohne Interesse, KU §§ 24, 26, 41), ‘no interest’ (kein
Interesse, KU §§ 5, 41), ‘with the consciousness of an abstraction in it from all inte-
rest’ (wovon jemand sich bewußt ist, daß das Wohlgefallen an demselben bei ihm
selbst ohne alles Interesse sei, KU § 6), ‘the aesthetic judgment […] does not pro-
duce an interest in the object’ (und ohne ein Interesse am Objekt zu bewirken, KU
§ 12), ‘[a]ny interest spoils of judgment of taste’ (Alles Interesse verdirbt das
Geschmacksurteil, KU § 13), ‘do not rest on any interest’ (daß es ohne alles
Interesse gefallen müsse, KU § 29), ‘must have no interest’ (und ohne Rücksicht auf
irgendein Interesse gefallen hat, KU § 41).
The main points of confluence between Aristotle’s notion of philia and the
Kantian notion of disinterestedness are described below. I understand the sequence
proposed as being necessary for a coherent argument on this happy meeting
between two concepts set apart by twenty-two centuries of a philosophy that at cer-
tain times gave little support to this kind of sacra conversazione between similar
concepts. The late Enlightenment period, aware of its own fragility, turned this
antipathy into a challenge and managed to get them into a conversation.
2.1. Philia requires “our friend well for his own sake”14 from the point of view
of disinterestedness
A friend is an empirical particular that can only be the object of discourse from
the paradigm of relationship and not from the paradigm of substance: one is a
‘friend’ simply because one has at least one friend. Friendship, then, is a relation-
ship between two empirical particulars; as Kant argues in the initial citation of this
article, ‘friendship, however, is a special bond between particular persons.’15 In the
same way, Kantian aesthetics is based on the relationship between particulars: Kant
talks about subjects with an aesthetic way of looking and objects viewed aestheti-
cally. The key to this relationship lies, as in the case of the Aristotelian philia, in the
disinterestedness of the subject, as proposed by the ‘definition of the beautiful
derived from the first moment’:
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15 Flynn (2007), Marcucci (1999), Munzel and Fenves (1998), Paton (1957), Veltman (2004) under-
take their discussions on the notion of friendship in Kant from the consideration of the particularity
characteristic of each person that exercises this bond and its implications in knowledge and the con-
struction of the public sphere.
Taste is the faculty for judging an object or a kind of representation through a satisfac-
tion or dissatisfaction without any interest. The object of such a satisfaction is called
beautiful.16
In this relationship, the priority assigned by Kant to the subject is related to the
effort involved in defending the autonomy of this subject within its own vulnerabil-
ity. For that reason, taste is defined as a faculty. It is, however, a peculiar faculty
that did not find its place in philosophy until Hume. If Kant places so much priori-
ty on this it is because, to his understanding, taste can only be conceived from dis-
interestedness, and that means a fertile (maybe the most fertile) philosophical pos-
sibility of the presupposition that individuals can be free and autonomous:17 they
can liberate themselves from their prejudices and their baggage and are prepared to
find common ground. This is precisely the ideal in the late Enlightenment period for
being a human being: someone who is not sure of being right but who, if problems
arise, will sit down at a table, leaving his prejudices and interests to one side, and
discuss the matter with other citizens as a self-confirming, proud but discreet exer-
cising of their freedom.18 Kant retrieves the old platonic spirit of philosophical dia-
logue, which can only begin and take place within the productive freedom to ‘think
aloud’ for and with others.19
This freedom, which could be referred to as aesthetic freedom, has to do with
the free play of faculties.20 Those who sit down at a table to have a conversation,
leaving to one side their prejudices and baggage, are prepared to avail their minds
of an openness to that which is possible (not necessarily in opposition to what is
real, but that which could be), as in Kant’s account of friendship in the initial cita-
tion of this article: it is a recourse for opening one’s mind to another particular
human being and communing with him. Kant places aesthetic pleasure in this new
ethical–aesthetic imperative of what nowadays we refer to as opening one’s mind,
which is a consequence of the sense of this new freedom in the exercising of facul-
ties. It is the pleasure of being prepared to find common ground and agreement
(whether this actually occurs or not); it is the pleasure of the search for communi-
cability. This is why the Mittelbarkeit (mediation) became one of the most recurrent
terms in the KU: the new individual (free, autonomous and fragile) can only find his
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16 Kant, I., KU § 5, 96; AA 5, p. 211.
17 Ibid., § 5, 95; AA 5, p. 210.
18 Ibid., § 6, 96–7; AA 5, pp. 211-212.
19 The political reading of the KU was initiated by Friedrich Schiller in his Letters upon the Aesthetic
Education of Man (1759-1805). This reading continues in contemporary philosophy in the writings of
Herbert Marcuse and Jacques Rancière, and especially in Hannah Arendt’s work Lectures on Kant’s
Political Philosophy (1982), where she takes the topic of sociable communication as the main ground
for this kind of approach.
20 See Kant, KU § 9, pp. 102–103; AA 5, 216–7. See also § 15, p. 113; AA 5, p. 228.
strength in the power of what is common, and therefore disinterestedness is a sine
qua non condition, just as it is for the pleasures of friendship.
2.2. What reciprocity meant to the late Enlightment notion of art. Beautiful art
as a path to sociable communication
Art plays a fundamental role as a place for thought along this new path of free-
dom and pleasure. The previous section focused on disinterestedness as the defin-
ing element of this link between a type of empirical particulars in the aesthetic rela-
tionship: that of the subjects. This section considers this category in terms of the
relationships established between the subjects that look aesthetically and the objects
that are viewed in that way. The aesthetic sense is the exercising of the faculty that
turns a piece of nature into a landscape, an object into a work of art. Kantian phi-
losophy cannot escape (as indeed none can) the debts of its own history and for that
reason it links this sense first to beauty,21 which Kant translates as a sense of pleas-
ure; and second to sublime, as a sense of displeasure (Unlust), a term that follows,
as disinterestedness and displeasure, the dynamic of negative aesthetics. Both sub-
lime and displeasure become negative categories of great innovative potential with
respect to the category of the ugly.22
However, the pleasure related to beauty is not just any type of pleasure, but the
pleasure of reflection: ‘this must not be a pleasure of enjoyment, from mere sensa-
tion, but one of reflection.’23 And reflection is a special mode of intelligibility of the
world, which can only be constructed from an empirical particular, in an attempt to
bestow upon it a universal that has not been established a priori and that needs to
be exercised to achieve communicability. The ideas governing this intelligibility are
of a new genre for philosophy: they are aesthetic ideas, being an aesthetic idea ‘a
representation of the imagination that occasions much thinking though without it
being possible for any determinate thought.’24 Consequently, they open the mind to
the field of the possible. The exercising of aesthetic sense, therefore, carries the
feeling of pleasure in the search for a sense that is not given, but constructed. And,
as a matter of fact, the rigorous unity between the first and second parts of the KU
is revealed above all in the concept of aesthetic idea. The exercising of reflection
requires the metaphysical stake on a sphere of ends regulated by the als ob, and this
is exactly the subject of the second part, which is nothing other than a treatise on
critical teleology precisely because of the power granted to that regulation.
Jèssica Jaques Pi Kant’s Aesthetic Reading of Aristotle’s Philia...
Revista de Filosofía
Vol. 37 Núm. 2 (2012): 55-68
61
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22 Ibid., §§ 23-9.
23 Ibid., § 44, 185; AA 5, p. 306.
24 Ibid., § 49, 192. AA 5, p. 314.
It is at the heart of that commitment that art has laid down strong roots to take
full advantage of the potential contained in paragraphs 43–45 of the KU. Kant con-
siders it a privileged place for the exercising of aesthetic sense and, therefore, for
the reflecting judgment; the case of the work of art is an occasion25 for exercising
the endowment of sense. The aesthetic judgment of art then becomes an area of
intelligibility, generating representations as ‘types of cognition,’26 given that art
‘promotes the cultivation of the mental powers for sociable communication.’27 And,
as a matter of fact, that is why judgment of art is ‘indifferent with regard to the exis-
tence of an object’ (§ 5: 95, AA 5: 94).28 Kant is making an effort here to distinguish
the fine art objects from other objects: while the latter are self comprehending from
their ends, the former begin to be so from their capacity to generate a new area of
intelligibility, which is reflection. So, Rafael’s Madonna is not a work of art because
it incites religious fervor, but because its beauty generates the free play of faculties
enabling them the exercising of reflection ‘for sociable communication.’ It is worth
remembering that according to Book II of Aristotle’s’ Physics ‘the existence of an
object’ means producing itself according to the fulfillment of its end, an aspect that
Kant specifically excludes in this effort to distinguish fine art from art that is sim-
ply techné. It is also worth remembering, with regards to the question of ‘sociable
communication,’ that at the time Kant was writing the KU the first art exhibitions
were already being seen as places for the construction of the public sphere.
However and moreover, in this possession of public sense, disinterestedness in
aesthetic judgment requires reciprocity with regards to the artistic object, as philia
required reciprocated feeling (Nicomachean Ethics 1155b). In other words, if sense
is given to the object in an act of affirmation of the subject’s autonomy in the exer-
cising of reflection ‘for sociable communication,’ the work of art will return to the
subject a potential sphere for self-intelligibility, precisely as a subject in the public
sphere. The proposal of a complicated term such as purposiveness without purpose,
coined playing with Aristotelian terms,29 as a transcendental principle of aesthetic
judgment, is an attempt to capture the first glimmer of that reciprocity. Certainly,
something resembling reciprocity exists between the subject that exercises aesthet-
ic sense and the work of art, and that reciprocity occurs in terms of fitting: the work
fits the subject, offering itself as an occasion for the exercising of reflection ‘for
sociable communication’; the subject fits the work, giving it a constituent sense of
being ‘for sociable communication’ and the work returns to the subject as sense of
self-understanding ‘for sociable communication.’ In short, the aesthetic relationship
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25 Ibid., § 49, 193; AA 5, p. 315.
26 Ibid., § 44, 184. AA 5, p. 305.
27 Ibid., § 44, 185. AA 5, p. 306.
28 Paul Guyer has discussed the tensions generated by this question in Guyer (1978).
29 See Kant, Introduction to KU §§ IV, V and VI.
between the subjects and the work of art needs to be given a reciprocal, and at the
same time, constituent sense of the public sphere, just as occurs in relationships of
friendship.
2.3. Exercising disinterestedness for sociable communication: what Kraft
brought to Vermögen
As seen in the previous section, disinterestedness as an aesthetic attitude favor-
ing social communication only happens in the act of judgment, which must be exer-
cised as much as possible to reach aesthetic expertise. Concerning philia, it only
exists as being performed. Exercising and performing have to do with the Kantian
derivation of the term urteilen from the first to the third Critique, where the term
Vermögen (Vermögen zu urteilen) is replaced by Kraft (Urteilskraft), being the title
of this work Kritik der Urteilskraft. In the quest to convert German into the lan-
guage of philosophy, the term Kraft takes up the Latin vis, which was situated on
the Aristotelian path from potentiality to actuality. Kant, in the mood of late
Enlightenment aesthetics, is no longer concerned about the faculty for judging in
itself, but about the exercising of that faculty at times of greatest uncertainty and
focusing for this reason in reflecting judgment. With this opting for the term Kraft,
Kant was taking on Hume’s aesthetic legacy and his vindication of experience and
exercise of judgment as the only ways to reach aesthetical expertise.
2.4. Disinterestedness, like philia, promote concord
It has already been discussed how Kant considers taste a privileged place for
preparing common ground, in the sense that the disinterestedness which character-
izes this faculty let aside purely subjective conditions, which may be harmful for
concord. So, disinterestedness promotes concord in the same way as philia does
(see Nicomachean Ethics 1155b). Paragraph 40 of the KU adds the explanation that
the communal sense gives full philosophical sense to the disinterestedness inherent
in taste:
By ‘sensus communis’, however, must be understood the idea of a communal sense, i.e.,
a faculty for judging that in its reflection takes account (a priori) of everyone else’s way
of representing in thought, in order as it were to hold its judgment up to human reason
as a whole.30
For the late Enlightenment’s new paradigm of communicability, the demand for
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recognition of the particular as well as of uncertainty require a fundamental modi-
fication of Kant’s ethics, which is set out in the Critique of Practical Reason and
the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. This modification includes in both
the first formulation of the categorical imperative (‘Act in such a way that you treat
humanity, whether in your own person or in any other person, always at the same
time as an end, never merely as a means’)31 and in the third one (‘Every rational
being must so act as if he were through his maxim always a legislating member in
the universal kingdom of ends’), a much more discreet and pragmatic consignment,
which is to take ‘account (a priori) of everyone else’s way of representing in
thought, in order as it were to hold its judgment up to human reason as a whole’;32
it is the challenge of being aware, from the hegemony of the imagination, of what
the other must be thinking. The exercising of the taste of reflection is similar, there-
fore, to the exercising of the search for concord (as is in friendship), given that, from
a position of disinterestedness, (it) ‘makes supposedly generally valid (public) judg-
ments.’33 This search for accordance is one of the reasons of Kant’s claim to sub-
jective universality for the judgment of taste,34 which, in its very formulation, vin-
dicates the inherent perplexity in the reflecting judgment35 and can only conceive
itself as a disposal towards communicability.36 The reference here is to that which,
for the late Enlightenment, is the strictly human.
2.5. What disinterestedness and philia mean to democracy
In the previous sections I have argued in favor of linking aesthetic disinterest-
edness to the wish for the generation of community. As has been alleged, it deals
with the comprehension of taste as the common sense and with aesthetic pleasure
as the pleasure of reflection. But reflection does not mean that this pleasure should
not be deeply vital. In fact, the sense of aesthetic pleasure is, for Kant, the feeling
of life,37 and there is little more that can be said about it, given that it is profound-
ly enigmatic. In any case, it ‘is found chiefly in those judgments that are called aes-
thetic, which concern the beautiful and the sublime in nature or in art’38 and, for
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31 Kant, I., Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten –GMS– , AA 4, p. 429. English version: Grounding
for the Metaphysics of Morals (1993). This text is on pages pp. 381-382.
32 Ibid., p. 237, AA 4, p. 436.
33 Kant, I., KU § 8, p. 99; AA 5, p. 214. Regarding the relationship between common sense and reflec-
tion see Kirchmyer Dobe (2010).
34 Kant, I., KU § 6, pp. 96-97, AA 5, pp. 211-212; § 7, pp. 97-98, AA 5, pp. 212-213; § 18, p. 121, AA
5, pp. 236-237; § 22, p. 123-124, AA 5, pp. 239-40.
35 Ibid., § pp. 8, 99-100, AA 5, pp. 213-214.
36 Ibid., § 40, pp. 175-176, AA 5, pp. 295-296; § 21, pp. 122-123, AA 5, pp. 238-239.
37 Ibid., § 1, pp. 89-90, AA 5, pp. 203-204.
Kant, the conscious appreciation of this feeling of life is a requirement for a happy
life.
The final objective in vindicating this particular type of aesthetic hedonism is
none other than that of consolidating the first steps in a democracy called for by
18th century philosophy, just as Aristotle called for it in the 4th century BC with his
philia.39 It can be said that in both cases disinterestedness is a commitment to the
fundamental requirements of democracy, which are those of consensus, a topic that
was important for Kant from his pre-critique period. In fact, in a letter to Marcus
Herz dated June 1771, he considers the standpoint of others as a key to consensus,
even with oneself:
You know very well that I am inclined not only to try to refute intelligent criticisms but
that I always weave them together with my judgments and give them the right to over-
throw all my previously cherished opinions. I hope that in that way I can achieve an
unpartisan perspective, by seeing my judgments from the standpoint of others, so that a
third opinion may emerge, superior to my previous ones.40
I would like to conclude with one of the most lucid texts from the third Critique,
found in the last paragraph of the first part, which serves as its synthesis. In this text,
the essence of what is human is situated within the universal feeling of participat-
ing in a common act and within the power of generating communication:
The propaedeutic for all beautiful art, so far as it is aimed at the highest degree of its
perfection, seems to lie not in precepts, but in the culture of the mental powers through
those prior forms of knowledge that are called humaniora, presumably because human-
ity means on the one hand the universal feeling of participation and on the other hand
the capacity for being able to communicate one’s inmost self universally, which prop-
erties taken together constitute the sociability that is appropriate to humankind.41
The KU converts the essential ends of human reason into ends regulated by a
new ideal of humanity: the human beings who have to judge by themselves. Their
judgments will be constructed from the pride of one’s own vulnerability, from the
audacity of thought and from confidence in the power of communication for social
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38 Ibid., p. 57, AA 5, p. 169.
39 In addition to Aristotle’s texts, Kant was also familiar with Epicure’s view on this question. See
Epicure, Gnomologium Vaticanum: E codice Vaticano graeco 52, MC, 27.
40 Kant, Briefe 67 [62], 7 Juni 1771. Briefwechsel, AA 10, p. 122. English version: Kant,
Correspondence (1999).
41 Kant, I., KU § 60, p. 229; AA 5, p. 355. See also § 41 and 42, pp. 176-182, AA 5, pp. 296-302. Here
Kant develops the topics of the awareness of the subject as a member of the public sphere and civi-
lization and of the need of beauty for this aim in the progress of humankind.
construction. These are the three human virtues required for the new philosophy of
the late Enlightenment, all three of them in strong relation to liberty, to reflection
and, consequently, to disinterestedness, as Aristotelian philia was.42 The third
Critique, in a late Enlightenment’s mood, led to understand that these three virtues,
like friendships, were not to be found in heaven, not in the best of the possible
worlds, but in the most human, common and everyday life. And both art and aes-
thetic sense became the best places to be aware of this late Enlightenment human
being that was taking account of his own liberty not in heavenly, but in public
spheres.
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